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taken a narrow view of the types of probationary conditions which are
unduly harsh and has thereby effectively limited the lower court's
discretion in determining a proper remedy. However, the determination
that the Federal Probation Act is applicable to corporations remains as
a previously unexplored means of dealing with a complex and unusual
type of criminal. Although the Atlantic Richfield court dismissed with
disappointing brevity the issues of probation conditions more onerous
than sentence and a defendant's right to refuse probation, the use of
probation to control the corporate entity is a significant idea worthy of
further use and development by the jUdiciary. A comprehensive view of
the Federal Probation Act which encompasses restitution by the criminal to aggrieved parties, supervision of the criminal by the courts, and
the eventual reformation of the criminal into a positive member of
society logically includes the violations of the corporate entity. As long
as other means of dealing with the illegal acts of corporations remain
ineffective, the use of probation deserves further development.
Rignal W. Baldwin

COPYRIGHT-EXTENSIVE PHOTODUPLICATION OF COpyRIGHTED SCIENTIFIC JOURNALS BY LIBRARIES DOES NOT
CONSTITUTE COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT. WILLIAMS & WILKINS CO. V. UNITED STATES, 487 F.2d 1345 (1973).
The speed and ease of reproduction by modern photoduplication
equipment has resulted in. an increase in reproduction which has posed
a problem to copyright holders. Photocopying diminishes the need for
the original work and impairs the protection afforded the owner of the
copyright. It poses a growing threat to the balance between the
constitutional right of the people to the free dissemination of
information' and the statutory right of the copyright holder to control
the use of his work. 2 Unfortunately, the present copyright ace is vague
1. U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8 provides:
The Congress shall have Power ... To promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective writings and Discoveries.
2. 17 U.S.C. § l(a) et. seq. (1970).
3. [d. The present Copyright Act was originally adopted in 1909. Since that time several
attempts at revision have been made beginning with the amendments proposed before the
Berne Convention in 1924. The Dallinger, Perkins and Vestal Bills were efforts to adhere to
the Berne Convention, as a result of which copyright protection was extended to the
motion picture industry. Following three more revisionary bills from 1931-39, and
amendments in accord with the 1954 Universal Copyright Convention, the Copyright Act
is still silent on what types and scope of copying, if any, do not constitute copyright
infringement. For the legislative history of U.S. copyright law see SENATE SUBCOMM. ON
PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS, THE HISTORY OF U.S.A. COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION
FROM 1901 to 1954, S. Res. 53, Study No.1, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-19 (1960).
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on the rights and privileges of the parties in this situation. Therefore,
until statutory clarification is effected, the issue must be settled by the
courts. The first case to challenge massive reproduction of copyrighted
material is Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States. 4
The Williams & Wilkins Co. (W & W) was a major publisher of
medical journals, four of which were the subject of this action. The
articles in these journals were submitted individually by their authors in
manuscript form to W & W who compiled them into journal issues and
distributed the journals by subscription. Because of the esoteric nature
of the journals, they commanded a very limited reading public. s Most
of the revenue received from these journals came from subscriptions.
Notice of W & W's copyright appeared at the beginning of every issue
and occasionally preceded the individual articles. Co-defendants, the
National Institute of Health (NIH) and the National Library of
Medicine (NLM), were two of W & W's subscribers. NIH maintained a
large technical library that, while used primarily by NIH researchers,
was also available to the public. The Library had an extensive
photocopying service for the benefit of the NIH staff. The library's
policy was to reproduce only a single copy of an article per request, and
only one article per journal issue. Exceptions to this policy were
routinely made as long as substantially less than an entire journal issue
was copied. The library received a sizable photocopy budget from the
federal government and accordingly did not charge the consumer for
the material copied.
The National Library of Medicine was established by Congress "to
aid the dissemination and exchange of scientific and other information
important to the progress of medicine and the public health .... "6 It
participated in an interlibrary loan program and, like NIH, maintained a
policy of furnishing only one copy of an article per request and
substantially less than an entire journal issue on any given request.
NLM, like NIH, made exceptions to their rule. It was also the policy of
NLM not to copy articles from journals which were on a "readily
available list" (on which list plaintiff's journals appeared) or articles
published within the past five years (the oldest of plaintiff's articles at
the time of photoduplication was twenty-two months). Again,
exceptions were routinely made. NLM's consumers included commercial organizations, particularly drug companies, as well as students,
universities, medical schools, and other libraries. 7
The Williams & Wilkins Co. alleged that the defendant's procedure
for photoduplicating its articles was wholesale copying and constituted
4. 487 F.2d 1345 (1973); petition for cert. filed, (U.S., Feb. 20, 1974) (No. 73-1279).
5. The most widely-subscribed to journal of the group in contest here is Gastroenterology,
which is perhaps the leading journal on the subject in the world. It commands a
subscription list of only about 7,000.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 275 (1970).
7. In 1970 N.I.H. photocopied an estimated 93,000 articles and L.L.M. filled about 120,000
requests for photocopied articles. These copies included plaintiffs articles.
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copyright infringement. 8 The Commissioner of the Court of Claims
upheld this claim, but was reversed on appeal in a 4-3 decision in favor
of the United States. 9
The question in this case was did NIH and NLM infringe upon the
copyright of W & W's medical journals by reproducing articles for third
persons without the permission of W & W? The difficulty in the
determination of that issue was that not every use of a copyrighted
material without the holder's permission constitutes infringement. I 0
Whether the use is excused depends upon the court's interpretation of
the circumstances of a given case in light of legal precedent. I I Courts
have been guided by such factors as the amount of the taking, how
much the reproduction satisfies the need for the original, the use to
which the copy is put, the potential loss to the copyright holder, and
the nature of the material copied. I 2 When these factors weighed in
favor of the copier, the courts have ruled the taking a "fair use" and
relieved the copier of infringement liability. I 3 But this formula is an
oversimplification of the doctrine of fair use as the application of each
factor to the facts of a case, or a body of cases, is not easily
accomplished. How much is too much, what relative weight should be
given each factor, and which factors come to bear on the propriety of a
use are considerations which have caused Congress to avoid the issue of
fair use and bewildered the courts in copyright cases. I 4
The application of "fair use" to library reproduction of copyrighted
material is in need of resolution. I 5 The court in the Williams & Wilkins
case recognized this need in what it called a "ground-breaking copyright
infringement action ... against the United States of America."16 It
carefully analyzed the history of copyright law, its roots in the United
States Constitution as a safeguard of the public's right to free
dissemination of information, and the gradual development of the
doctrine of fair use. The court synthesized the evidence and made a
determination that massive photocopying by libraries of copyrighted
scientific journals without the owner's permission did not constitute
copyright infringement. The majority opinion was heavily influenced
by the fact that the subject matter was scientific. I 7 The court reasoned
8. This action was brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1498(b) (1970). Prior to 1960 this section
provided for only patent actions to be brought against the United States. Pursuant to the
Copyright Act, it was amended to include actions against the U.S. for monetary damages
for copyright infringement.
9. Judges Skelton, Kashiwa and Bennett joined in the extensive majority opinion written by
Judge Davis. The dissent, written by Chief Judge Cowan and joined in by Judge Kunzig,
was equally in·depth and comprehensive. Judge Nichols wrote an independent dissent.
10. Loew's. Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 165, 175 (S.D. Cal.
1955); Karll v. Curtis Pub. Co., 39 F. Supp. 836, 837 (E.D. Wis. 1941).
11. Loew's Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 165, 174 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
12. Mathews Conveyor Co. v. Palmer-Bee Co., 135 F.2d 73, 85 (6th Cir. 1943).
13. M. B. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 145 at 645-48 (1972 ed.).
14. [d. at 643. See also Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d at 1363.
15. Hearings on S. 1361 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks. and Copyrights of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary. 93d Cong., 1st Sess., Statements at 92-97 (1973).
16. 487 F.2d at 1346.
17. [d. at 1357, 1358, 1359.
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that the free and unobstructed dissemination of scientific information
more adequately advanced the constitutional right of the people to
receive the benefit from such scientific information than did the strict
enforcement of the plaintiff's copyright.! 8 This, coupled with the fact
that NIH and NLM received no profit from the copies, gave the court
justification to determine that the use made was fair in spite of the fact
that an entire, verbatim copy was made.! 9
Evidently aware of the widespread implications of its opinion and
apprehensive of the possible limitations of the factual situation in
Williams & Wilkins, the court retreated in the last paragraphs of its
opinion and refused to establish a hard and fast rule. The court said
that Williams & Wilkins was to be cited as no more than an
interpretation of the particular facts of that case. 2 0 The court
expressed the hope that the opinion would serve as a "holding
operation"2! until the legislature assumes the responsibility of
definition in this area, a duty which it has avoided since 1909.
Various tests of "fair use" have been employed to determine whether
the taking was substantia1. 22 A "Gentlemen's Agreement" between
publishers and consumers, discussed in the Williams & Wilkins dissent,
included a qualification on copying which stipulated that the taking
must not be so substantial as to constitute infringement.
While the right of quotation without permission is not
provided in law, the courts have recognized the right to a "fair
use" of book quotations, the length of a "fair" quotation being
dependent upon the type of work quoted from and the
"fairness" to the author's interest. Extensive quotation is
obviously inimical to the author's interest * * * It would not be
fair to the author or publisher to make possible the substitution
of the photostats for the purchase of a copy of the book itself
either for an individual library or for any permanent collection
in a public or research library. Orders for photocopying which,
by reason of their extensiveness or for any other reasons, violate
this principle should not be accepted. 2 3
The dissenters agreed that there can be no evaluation of the elements of
fair use if the copying is of an entire work. Therefore, they refused to
consider the facts that the subject matter in Williams & Wilkins was
scientific, that the defendants made no profit from the copying, and
18. [d. at 1359.
19. [d. at 1354.
20. [d. at 1362.

21. [d. at 1363.
22. Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302, 303-04 (E.D. Pa.
1938).
23. 487 F.2d at 1379-80. The "Gentlemen's Agreement" was drafted in 1935 as a result of
meetings between libraries and various members of the publishing industry. While it does
not have the effect of law and has never been involved in judicial proceedings, it is
indicative of what is reasonable and customary in the field.
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that the plaintiff failed to prove actual damages. These are irrelevant
factors when the discussion is one of "wholesale copying.,,2 4
In spite of the court's reluctance to establish a concrete and uniform
ruling which would unambiguously extend the traditional protection of
the copyright holder to mass photoduplication, the decision in Williams
& Wilkins is a landmark in copyright law, and the error of that decision
should be examined.
The court erred in investigating the factors relating to fair use, since a
substantial taking of an entire work precludes fair use. Different
amounts of copying are allowed by the courts in different circumstances. If the material copied is scientific or educational, for example,
the courts have applied a liberal standard to how much can be copied
before infringement occurs.2 5 If the entire work is copied, however, as
was the case in Williams & Wilkins, the surrounding circumstances are
irrelevant. "Wholesale" copying can never be fair use. 2 6
Copyright protection did not exist at common law. 2 7 The author
had a property right in his unpublished work, but once the work was
published, that right was lost and the work entered into the public
domain. 28 The copyright protection which exists today is purely
statutory.29 Both parties to the action in Williams & Wilkins agreed
that the interpretation of that statute must be based on the purpose of
the constitutional provision empowering Congress to enact the law. 3 0
The purpose in granting copyright protection is "[t] 0 promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts .... "3 1 To implement that end the
courts "must occasionally subordinate the copyright holder's interest in
a maximum financial return to the greater public interest in the
development of art, science, and industry.,,3 2 It has been suggested
that the limitation of fair use on the statutory privilege of the copyright
holder is based on the first and ninth amendments to the Constitution. 33 The constitutional argument is that the first amendment right
of the American people to freedom of speech coupled with their ninth
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

32.
33.

487 F.2d at 1366.
Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302, 304 (E.D. Pa. 1938).
Leon v. Pacific Tel. & Tel., 91 F.2d 484,486 (9th Cir. 1937).
Jefferys v. Boosey, 4 H.L. Cas. 815, 24 L.J. Ex. 81 (1854). See also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S.
201, 214 (1954).
Bobbs·Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908).
Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1970).
Cf, Bleinstein v. Donaldson Lithography Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249 (1903). The Constitutional
provision empowering Congress to enact a copyright statute is cited supra note 1.
Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966);
Mathews Conveyor Co. v. Palmer-Bee Co., 135 F.2d 73 (6th Cir. 1943). Some courts have
stated that any reward to the copyright holder which is precipitated by the statutory
protection is secondary to the main consideration of encouragement of the production of of
literary works. United States v. Paramount Pictures Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948).
Greenbie v. Noble, 151 F. Supp. 45, 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 543-44 (2d Cir. 1964).
Brief for Nat'l Educ. Ass'n as Amicus Curae at 16-17, 31-34, Williams & Wilkins Co. v.
United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (1973).

1974]

Recent Developments

311

amendment right to free dissemination of information reduce the
copyright holder's protection to a privilege granted in the interest of
furthering the constitutional right of the people. The reasoning is that
copyright protection will encourage authors to disseminate their
information so "that the world may not be deprived of improvements,
nor the progress of the arts be retarded.,,3 4 In no case, however, is the
encouragement of the author to frustrate the very purpose for which it
exists, to afford the people free and unobstructed access to
information. 3s
The defendant in Williams & WilI,ins used the above argument to
indicate that the public right to the information in the journals is more
dependent upon the photocopying service they provide than it is on the
protection of plaintiff's copyright.3 6 While it cannot be denied that the
purpose of copyright protection is to further the sciences and the arts,
the approach of the majority opinion will limit the flow of information
to the public. Free and unobstructed dissemination of copyrighted
information is as dependent upon the publisher's profit in printing it as
it is upon the author's decision to release it. The legislative purpose of
copyright law is to encourage authors and publishers to release their
work so that the people have access to information, pursuant to their
constitutional right. 37 It is difficult to imagine how a publisher of
medical journals cannot be involved in the "development of art, science
and industry,"3 8 nor how the American people can avail themselves of
their right to access without his services. It is only reasonable,
therefore, that a publisher be sufficiently compensated for those
services, so that he may continue profitably to publish the information
to which the people have a constitutional right. In Mazer u. Stein, Mr.
Justice Reed stated:
"The copyright law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to
the owner a secondary consideration." However, it is "intended
definitely to grant valuable enforceable rights to authors,
publishers, etc., without burdensome requirements; to afford
greater encouragement to the production of literary (or artistic)
works of lasting benefit to the world.,,3 9
The cases which have addressed themselves to the constitutional
purpose for copyright law have done so predominantly in support of
34. See Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co .. 23 F. Supp. 302, 304 (E.D. Pa.
1938).
35. Brief for Nat'\. Educ. Ass'n as Amicus Curae at 10, Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United
States, 487 F .2d 1345 (1973).
36. Brief for Defendant at 29, Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 172 U.S.P.Q. 670
(1972).
37. Brief for Nat'\. Educ. Ass'n as Amicus Curae at 53, Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United
States, 487 F .2d 1345 (1973).
38. Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 543-44 (2d Cir. 1964).
39. 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (citations omitted).
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their decision to uphold the defense of fair use. 40 In those cases, the
issue was the substantiality of the taking. The doctrine of "fair use"
itself has been described as a judicial attempt "to bring some order out
of the confusion surrounding the question of how much can be copied."4 I In an effort to define when the defense of fair use is appropriate for examination, the courts have adopted a policy consistent with
the constitutional argument. In general, when the taking is for the
furtherance of the sciences or the arts, a broader range of use will be
allowed in the evaluation of substantiality than will be allowed for
commercial uses. 4 2
In Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco CO.,43 where a
tobacco company used three lines of a copyrighted medical book in an
advertisement, the court finding infringement, ruled that to be a
substantial taking the material used need not be the whole of even a
large part thereof. The court recognized the broader scope given to
substantiality in the case of scientific works, but declined to place the
defendant's advertisement in that category. The court stated that
neither the innocent intent of the defendant nor his acknowledgement
of the authorship of the sentences used would be a valid defense where
the taking was sUbstantial. 4 4
In Hill v. Whalen & Martel,4 5 which dealt with the infringing use of
cartoon characters obviously resembling the copyrighted Mutt and Jeff
figures, the court used as its test of fair use "whether or not so much has
been reproduced as will materially reduce the demand for the
original.'>4 6 That court reasoned that if the copied work could
effectively replace the original, injury must logically result to the
copyright holder, giving him an action for infringement. Infringement
40. Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House. Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966)
(defendant's insubstantial use of biographic information about Howard Hughes. some of
which defendant's author used in·production of his book on Hughes held protected); Berlin
v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1964) (use of same meter but not lyrics as
plaintiffs song in a parody created by defendant, allowed); Greenbie v. Noble, 151 F.
Supp. 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (defendant's insubstantial taking held not to constitute
infringement in a book concerning a historical figure); Mathews Conveyor Co. v.
Palmer-Bee Co., 135 F.2d 73 (6th Cir. 1943) (copying of engineering sketches from
plaintiffs copyrighted catalogue by defendant held too insubstantial to constitute
infringement) .
41. 14 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 443,449 (1939) (emphasis added).
42. Loew's, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. 131 F. Supp. 165, 176 (S.D. Cal. 1955),
affd sub nom. Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), affd by an equally
divided court, 356 U.S. 43 (1958); Henry Holt & Co., v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23
F. Supp. 302, 304 (E.D. Pa. 1938).
43. 23 F. Supp. 302, 303 (E.D. Pa. 1938).
44. [d. Judge Maris also noted that plaintiff was not required to show actual damages as a
requisite to a judgment in his favor. Id. at 304. The majority opinion in the Williams &
Wilkins case found the plaintiffs failure to prove actual damages to be influencial in their
decision. 17 U.S.C § 101 provides in pertinent part:
[0 Jr in lieu of actual damages and profits, such damages as to the court shall appear to be just, and in assessing such damages the court may, in its discretion, allow the amounts as hereinafter stated ....
45. 220 F. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1914).
46. [d. at 360.
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has been found where the details of a song were substantially similar to
a copyrighted song,47 and where the intricacies of a copyrighted
dramatic expression appeared in similar form in a subsequent play.4 8
Three cases clearly declared that where the taking was considered
substantial, the doctrine of "fair use" would not apply. In Leon u.
Pacific Telephone & Telegraph,49 where the defendant rearranged
telephone numbers derived from plaintiff's copyrighted directory, the
court ruled conclusively on the issue of substantial taking. In response
to the defense of fair use the court said:
It is not necessary in the case before us to discuss generally
the question of what constitutes "fair use." Obviously, every
publication copyrighted admits of many uses which do not
constitute infringement. Counsel have not disclosed a single
authority, nor have we been able to find one, which lends any
support to the proposition that wholesale copying and
publication of copyrighted material can ever be fair use ....

The court quoted this statement emphasizing the word "ever" in Benny
u. Loew's, Inc.,5 0 where Jack Benny asserted the defense of fair use
due to years of custom in his burlesque television adaptation of the
play "Gas Light." More recently in Wihtol u. Craw,s I whose facts more
closely resemble the situation in the Williams & Wilkins case, the court
refused to define fair use but held that "it is inconceivable ... that the
copying of all or substantially all, of a copyrighted work can be held to
be a "fair use" merely because the infringer has no intent to infringe .
• . • ,,52 In that case, a school music director rearranged the author's
song for no profit and with no intent to infringe upon the existing
copyright. He duplicated fifteen copies of the rearrangement which he
distributed to the students in his choral group. He did the same for the
Methodist church where he worked. He then wrote to the author asking
him if he would be interested in receiving a copy, to which letter the
author responded with an infringement action which was upheld on the
basis of substantial taking.
The proposition that fair use is the opposite of substantial taking
appears easy to apply. However, the difficulty in determining what is
substantial has led courts to examine other evidence. s 3 The potential
damage to the sale of the author's work persuaded the court in one
47. Wihtol v. Wells. 231 F.2d 550 (7th Cir. 1956).
48. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 298
U.S. 669 (1937). Judge Learned Hand made a distinction between the uncopyrightable
theme and ideas of a work and the copyrightable expression of those ideas. For a discussion of court rulings on the adaptation of a theme versus the use of an expression see Shipman v. R.K.O. Pictures, Inc., 100 F.2d 533 (2d Cir. 1938).
49. 91 F.2d 484, 486 (9th Cir. 1937).
50. 239 F.2d 532. 536 (9th Cir. 1956). aird by an equally divided court, 356 U.S. 43 (1958).
51. 309 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1963).
52. [d. at 780.
53. M. 8. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 145 at 643-48 (1972 ed.).
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case,S 4 while the use to which the copy was put was determinative in
another. s S In Karll v. Curtis Publishing Co., S 6 in which the latter
element was controlling, the court found that the reproduction of the
chorus of the author's Green Bay Packers theme song in a magazine
article boosting the Packers was only an "incidental" use of the lines
copied. The court further stated that they did not compete with the
song itself, particularly in view of the absence of the music. This last
consideration seems to amount to a determination of substantial use.
Combining the elements of potential damage to the author's sales
with "incidental" use, the court upheld fair use where the satirized
lyrics of an author's song appeared in a humor magazineS 7 but rejected
it where a song parody was published in a song sheet. S 8 In the case of
the former, the parody could not effectively fulfill the demand for the
original, while in the case of the latter, it could.
Finally, it has been generally acknowledged that the defense of fair
use is applicable to literary criticism regardless of how substantial the
taking is.s 9 This principle has been accepted because the criticism has
no potential for replacing the demand for the original. In view of the
fact that the defendants' copying in the Williams & Wilkins case was not
only substantial, but complete, it would appear that the only possibility
for a defense of fair use would be an unprecedented extention of the
literary criticism doctrine to use for research and educational purposes.
The element threatening this link is the inexhaustable and boundless
reach of photocopied material which is used entirely as a replacement
for the original. While this is the first case to be brought in the shadow
of modern photocopy technology,60 the judicial precedent and

54. See Public Affairs Assoc., Inc. v. Rickover, 284 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1960), vacated for
insuft. record, 369 U.S. ll1 (1962); Hill v. Whalen & Martell. Inc .. 220 F. 359 (S.D.N.Y.
1914).
55. Karll v. Curtis Publishing Co .. 39 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Wis. 1941).
56. [d.
57. Berlin v. E.C. Publications. Ind., 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1964).
58. Leo Feist, Inc. v. Song Parodies, Inc., 146 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1944).
59. Consumers Union of the United States v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 189 F. Supp. 275, 278
(S.D. N.Y. 1960).
60. A case involving advanced technology in cable television and its effects on copyright law is
Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists, 392 U.S. 390 (1968). There the Supreme Court held
that the reception and distribution of television signals by a cable television system did not
constitute "performance" necessary for copyright infringement. In the recent case,
Columbia Broadcasting System Inc. v. Teleprompter Corp .. 94 S.Ct. 859 (1974), the
Supreme Court again found no copyright infringement by CATV for the reception and
rebroadcasting of C.B.S. signals. Mr. Justice Stewart concluded that regardless of the
distance of the original transmitter from the recei\'ing CATV, a broadcast made "public
for simultaneous viewing" can be received and retransmitted by CATV without infringement upon the copyright of the original broadcaster. This decision, while not bearing
directly on massive photoduplication by libraries, shows an inclination of the court to
favor a public service motive to tbe sacrifice of copyright protection. It is not unlikely that
such an inclination will prevail against the Williams & Wilkins Co. if the Supreme Court
grants certiorari.
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legislative purpose discussed above indicate that the extension of the
literary criticism exception here seems inappropriate and unlikely.
In order to apply the argument of substantial taking to preclude the
defense of fair use in the Williams & Wilkins case, it is necessary to
determine if an article has the status of a complete copyrightable
work. 6 1 The copyright statute itself, and its interpretation by the
courts, lends some insight into this determination. The pertinent
section provides in part:
The copyright upon component works or periodicals shall give
to the proprietor thereof all the rights in respect thereto which
he would have if each part were individually copyrighted under
this title. 6 2
Because an article is a component "part,,63 of a periodical capable of
individual copyright protection,64 the test of substantiality is generally
applied not only to each issue of a periodical but to every article
therein as wel1. 65 This principle is further evidenced when one realizes
that the author of each manuscript may copyright his work and assign
both the work and the copyright protection to the publisher, leaving
the latter with a compilation of individually copyrighted works which
he may then copyright in its cumulative form.
Therefore, since the test of substantiality is applicable to individual
articles and since a substantial taking cannot be fair use, W & W should
have prevailed. For the Court of Claims to have decided that the
defendants' use of W & W's copyrighted articles was fair the court had
to establish anew, and dangerous, precedent that copyright protection
may be ignored when the copier is non-profit and the material copied is
scientific.
The court relied heavily upon the fact that plaintiff showed no actual
61. Brief for plaintiff at 23, Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States. 487 F.2d 1345 (1973).
62. 17 U.S.C. § 3 (1970). Protection of Component Parts of Works Copyrighted; Composite
Works or Periodicals:
The copyright provided by this title shall protect all the copyrightable
component parts of the work copyrighted, and all matter therein in which copyright
is already subsisting, but without extending the duration or scope of such copyright.
The copyright upon composite works or periodicals shall give to the proprietor
thereof all the rights in respect thereto which he would have if each part were
individually copyrighted under this title.
63. See, e.g., King Features Syndicate v. Fleischer, 299 F. 533 (2d Cir. 1924).
64. Markham v. A.E. Borden Co., 206 F.2d 199 (1st Cir. 1953). In this case defendant copied
nine items of a copyrighted catalogue containing several hundred items. The court
explained that if each item were not viewed as the subject of its particular copyright, the
protection of the whole would be meaningless. 206 F.2d at 202.
65. Hedeman Products Corp. v. Tap-Rite Products. 228 F. Supp. 630, 634 (D.N.J. 1964).
However. in response to a request for summary judgment, the court refused to rule
conclusively on the component part issue where the defendant had photocopied the title,
editorial page masthead and the leading editorial of an issue of the Herald Tribune. New
York Tribune v. Otis & Co., 39 F. Supp. 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
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damages and that a 1962 study found that· pbotocopying had no
adverse effects on publishers of copyrighted material. 66 The court
reasoned that since students have traditionally been allowed to take
notes on entire works or to photocopy a portion thereof for
themselves, there is no reason not to extend this necessarily limited
practice to mass and rapid photocopying by libraries upon request}6 7
The difference, of course, is in the extensiveness of the copying and the
increased potential that the practice will fulfill the demand of the
original. In his treatise on copyright, Professor Nimmer pointed out:
There would appear to be a qualitative difference between each
individual scholar performing the task of reproduction for
himself, and the library or other institution performing the task
on a wholesale basis for all scholars. If the latter is fair use then
must not the same be said for a non-profit publishing house that
distributes to scholars unauthorized copies of scientific and
educational works on a national or international basis?6 8
The existence of this latter situation, of course, would render all
copyright law protection completely meaningless with regard to
scientific or educational works. If such were the case, once the
protection were eliminated, the purpose for which it was created would
be eliminated, and the resulting constitutional right would be
constructively eliminated, all of which would leave scientists and
scholars in no better position than they were at common law.
CONCLUSION
The majority opinion in Williams & Will~ins is clearly erroneous as
the doctrine of fair use cannot be examined where wholesale taking
exists. Though the constitutional purpose of the copyright legislation
has been interpreted to broaden the scope of the taking in the fields of
science and art, there can be no breadth of taking wide enough to
justify reproduction of an entire work. The fact that students
traditionally have hand and machine copied research material, that the
defendants made no profit from their photocopying services, and that
plaintiff did not undertake to prove actual damages may be relevant to
a determination of fair use. However, such a determination is
inappropriate in the Williams & Wilkins Co. case because the complete
taking precludes the application of the doctrine. 6 9
66. GEORGE FRY & Assoc., FRY REPORT, SURVEY OF COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL REPRODUCTION
PRACTICES IN SCIENTIFIC & TECHNICAL FIELDS (1962). For an opposing view see Project-New
Technology and the Law of Copyright; Reprography and Computers, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REV.
931 (1968). See also Statement of Mrs. Andrea Albrecht, Director of Marketing Research,
On Behalf of Williams & Wilkins Co., Hearings of Senate Subcomm. on Patents,
Trademarks and Copyrights, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 150-53 (1973).
67. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d at 1356.
68. M.B. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT 654 (1972 ed.l.
69. Leon v. Pacific Tel. & Tel., 91 F.2d 484, 486 (9th Cir. 1937).
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Modern technology is continuously presenting new challenges, many
of which are best met by Congress in their legislative capacity and not
by the courts. In an early attempt to revise copyright legislation to
better suit technological advances, Congress received reports on the
effect of photoduplication of copyrighted material. 70 While drawing no
conclusions as to the severity or insignificance of the effect, a
Congressional report suggested several legislative alternatives to the
photocopying problem. One solution, which works effectively in the
German Federal Republic and in Austria, is the payment of royalties to
the publisher of copyrighted materials less than three years 01d. 7 I
Another alternative, and the one suggested by plaintiff in the present
case, is licensing of photoduplication rights. Under this scheme the
subscriber pays a minimal additional amount to the publisher at the
time of subscription and obtains thereby the right to photocopy the
work in accordance with its own system. This alternative would also
eliminate any delay in time between a request and the fulfillment
thereof. 72
Although it is important for the courts to realize the possibility of
legislative relief, it is not the court's duty to legislate, but rather to
interpret the law. "It is not only contrary to law but to business ethics
to appropriate the property of another for one's use without the
permission of the owner of that property, whatever its nature may
be.,,73
It would be irresponsible for the Supreme Court to sieze upon the
reservation of the Court of Claims and refuse to decide the matter
because it relates only to the facts of Williams & Wilkins. Libraries all
over the country have the capacity to, and are, reproducing
copyrighted works in massive quantities. The courts must not cast the
burden of a decision of this importance upon a legislature which has
been unable to cope with the problem statutorily since its inception. A
final determination of the issue is overdue while the problem
compounds daily.
Judith D. 0 'Neill
70. SENATE SUBCOMM, ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS, THE HISTORY OF U.S.A.
COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION FROM 1901 TO 1954, S. Res. 53, Study No. I, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.,
1-19 (1960).
71. SENATE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS, COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, S.
Res. 240, Studies No. 14-16, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-134 (1960).
72. SENATE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS, PHOTODUPLICATION OF
COPYRIGHTED MATERIALS BY LIBRARIES, S. Res. 240, Study No. 15, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 49
(1960).
73. Elisha Hanson, response in COMMENTS AND VIEWS SUBMITTED TO COPYRIGHT OFFICE ON
PHOTODUPLICATION OF COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL BY LIBRARIES, SENATE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS,
TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS, S. Res. 240, Study No. 15, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 75 (1960).

